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Abstract 
Is sports safety policy being translated into practice: What can be learnt from the Australian 
Rugby Union Mayday Procedure? 
 
Aim 
To investigate the level of translation of the Australian Rugby Union “Mayday” safety procedure into 
practice among community rugby union coaches in New South Wales (Australia).   
Methods 
All registered coaches of senior community rugby union teams in five zones/associations in the north 
eastern region of the state were invited to complete a short online questionnaire at the end of the 2010 
rugby season. The questionnaire was designed around the five RE-AIM dimensions and assessed: 
Reach, perceived Effectiveness, Adoption, Implementation, and Maintenance of the Mayday 
procedure.  
Results  
Seventy (39%) coaches participated. There was a high level of awareness of the Mayday procedure, 
and most coaches believed it was effective in preventing injuries. The majority reported training their 
players in the procedure, although training was generally infrequent. Coaches were confident that 
their own players could implement the procedure appropriately if required to do so, but less confident 
that other teams or referees could do so. Barriers to providing training included: not enough players at 
training; players not taking training seriously; and technical difficulties (e.g. verbalisation of 
instructions for physical tasks). 
Conclusion 
The findings suggest that the translation of the Mayday ‘policy’ could be improved by building 
individual coach, and club or zone organisational capacity by: ensuring coaches have the resources 
and skills in ‘how’ to train their players to complement their existing knowledge on ‘what’ to train 
them; setting expectations that encourage coaches to provide regular training for players; and regular 
monitoring of player competency to perform the procedure appropriately. 
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Is sports safety policy being translated into practice: What can be learnt from the Australian 
Rugby Union Mayday Procedure? 
 
Introduction 
 
It has been widely acknowledged that even the most efficacious intervention will fail to have a public 
health impact in the absence of widespread and sustained implementation. 1 2 Consequently, there has 
been considerable recent interest in understanding how to facilitate the translation of sports injury 
prevention interventions—including macro- and micro-level policies—into sustained changes in 
practice in the real-world settings of community sport. 3 4 5 Future advances in sports injury 
prevention will require an understanding of the implementation context including intervention 
uptake.3 The  RE-AIM health promotion evaluation framework 1 has been proposed as a useful guide 
to inform injury prevention “implementation” research efforts in community sport. 2 
 
The prevention of spinal injuries has been a priority for rugby union administrators and researchers 
for many years 6 because of the potential catastrophic consequences of such injuries 7 and the 
recognition that parental safety concerns are a barrier to children’s participation in the game.8 Spinal 
injury prevention efforts, including the introduction of the four stage ‘crouch-touch-pause-engage’ 
scrum engagement sequence, have contributed to reductions in the number of scrum-engagement 
spinal injuries in rugby union. 9 10 
 
In addition to modifying the scrum engagement process, the Australian Rugby Union (ARU) also 
introduced the “Mayday” procedure as a “a safety technique put into operation when a player believes 
that he/she is in a potentially dangerous position in a scrum.” 11 The Mayday procedure was 
introduced because it was considered necessary to have a recognised call Australia-wide which would 
lead to players and referees having an appropriate and standardised response when a potentially 
dangerous situation occurred in a scrum. 12 The Mayday procedure is now included in the ARU 
medical and safety recommendations for players, coaches, administrators & match officials. 11 It is 
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also a compulsory part of the ARU occupational health and safety program (SmartRugby) for every 
coach and referee participating in Australian rugby where there is a tackling component. 13 All 
coaches of such teams are required to be SmartRugby certified, with re-certification being required 
every two years. 
 
Figure 1: Description of the process to be followed by players and the referee when the “MAYDAY” call is 
heard 11. Reproduced with permission. 
 
The Mayday procedure provides for quick release of pressure in a ‘standing’ scrum and a controlled 
‘collapsing and unpacking’ of the scrum to avoid flexion and rotation of the neck of the potentially 
injured participant. It was developed in consultation with medical experts, exercise physiologists and 
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rugby coaching development personnel, informed by an understanding of the forces and biomechanics 
of scrummaging 14, the mechanisms of spinal injury and anecdotal accounts from injured players or 
players who had felt at risk during scrummaging. The Mayday procedure is described in Figure 1. 
 
Although the effectiveness of the Mayday procedure has not been formally evaluated, it has the 
potential to prevent or reduce the severity of neck and spinal injuries among community rugby 
players. However, there are well recognised difficulties in ensuring the dissemination and uptake of 
centrally developed safety policy in community sport, 15 16 17 18 and it is likely that opportunities exist 
to improve the reach, adoption, implementation and maintenance of the Mayday procedure among 
community rugby coaches.  19 
 
The purpose of this study was to generate an understanding of the current level of translation of the 
Mayday procedure among community rugby union coaches in New South Wales (NSW, Australia) 
based on the five constructs of the RE-AIM framework. 1 The information gathered will be used to 
underpin the development of a theory-informed diffusion plan for the Mayday procedure among 
community rugby union coaches in the 2011 season.  
 
Methods  
 
All (n=179) ARU registered coaches of senior community rugby union teams (including colts, U19s 
and U17s) in five zones/associations in north eastern region of New South Wales (NSW), were 
invited via email to complete a 10 minute online questionnaire at the end of the 2010 rugby season. 
To encourage participation, the invitation came from the ARU development officer responsible for 
supporting and liaising with community clubs and coaches in the region. All responses were 
submitted online to the authors to ensure anonymity. All potential participants were sent an original 
email invitation plus two email reminders, followed by a phone call or text message. They were also 
given the opportunity to enter a draw for an individual and a club rugby-related prize to encourage 
participation.  
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The questionnaire was designed around the five RE-AIM dimensions and included items to assess: 
reach (three items); perceived effectiveness (four items); adoption (four items), implementation (eight 
items) and maintenance (two items) of the Mayday procedure by community rugby union coaches. 
The original RE-AIM construct as used by Glasgow et al 1 was modified to become perceived 
effectiveness. The rationale behind this modification was that, according to diffusion of innovations 
theory,20 the rate of translation, in contrast to the public health impact, of an innovation depends more 
on the end users’ subjective perception of its effectiveness than it does on the objective evidence of 
the innovation’s efficacy. The questionnaire was piloted with a small sample of community rugby 
union coaches and minor changes were made before administration with the study sample. 
 
Data analysis was undertaken using SPSS version 17. Descriptive analysis of numeric data included 
frequencies, means (standard deviation (SD)), and medians. Cross tabulations (two-by-two) were 
undertaken using the Fisher exact probability test for small expected counts. Six key criteria of the 
procedure (aligned with the first six steps of players as shown in Figure 1) were used to assess 
coaches’ free-text descriptions of the key points of the Mayday procedure. Responses to this question 
were independently assessed by four people (both authors and two ARU representatives) against these 
criteria and any rating discrepancies were discussed and agreed upon. Other qualitative data was 
analysed thematically (by the first author). 
 
The Medical and Community Human Research Ethics Advisory Panel at the University of New South 
Wales approved the study. 
 
Results 
 
Seventy-seven coaches attempted the questionnaire but data was consistently missing for seven of 
these, giving a maximum response rate of 39%. The number of responses received (“n”) varied 
between individual questions so the responses for each question are indicated in the text as necessary. 
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On average, coaches were 45 years old (SD=11; n=70), had 12 years of coaching experience (SD=10; 
n=69,) and coached 39 players, in 2010 (SD=22; n=67). 
 
Reach: Awareness and knowledge of the Mayday procedure 
Awareness and exposure to training 
All coaches (n=67) indicated that they were aware of the Mayday procedure and almost all (94%) 
indicated they had attended Mayday procedure training (n=64).  
 
Information on how they became aware (n=64) 
Coaches reported becoming aware of the Mayday procedure through ARU coaching courses (91%); 
ARU coaching resources (38%); other coaches (25%); online newsletters and websites (8%); and their 
experience as players (9%). 
 
Knowledge of the six key criteria of the Mayday Procedure  
Coaches were asked to describe the Mayday procedure in their own words. An example of a 
description that was considered to include all key criteria was “Player calls mayday (Criteria 1), other 
players repeat (Criteria 2) and stop pushing (Criteria 3), ref blows whistle, props release outside bind, 
all players drop to knees (Criteria 4) lower top of body to the ground, front row do a face plant 
(Criteria 5) and ref calls players out of scrum from the 8 after he finds out who called mayday 
(Criteria 6).” An example not including any of the key criteria was “Stay calm. Get help ASAP. 
Remove all players from the injured player if possible.”  Table 1 indicates the number of responses 
identifying the key criteria for the Mayday procedure.  (n=64). 
 
 
 
 
 
8 
 
Criteria Identified count (%)
The player under pressure makes a loud call, “MAYDAY” 50 (78%) 
Other members of the scrum repeat Mayday call 7 (11%) 
All players immediately stop pushing to release pressure on the front row 33 (52%) 
All players in the scrum immediately drop to their knees. 23 (36%) 
The front row then land on their faces 15 (23%) 
All players remain in this position and listen to the referee’s instructions 36 (56%) 
Table 1: Number of coaches identifying each Mayday criteria (n=64). 
 
Perceived Effectiveness 
The majority of coaches (72%) rated the Mayday procedure as completely or very effective (rating of 
four or five out of five) in preventing injuries (n=64). One third (33%) rated the Mayday procedure as 
completely or very effective in increasing participation (n=63), while about one quarter rated it as 
completely or very effective in increasing performance (24%) or in encouraging players to play in the 
front row (27%). See Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2: Coach perceived effectiveness of the Mayday procedure. 
 
When asked to identify other benefits of the Mayday procedure coaches listed: alleviating the 
concerns of parents or partners of players, or stopping players being steered away from the sport (ten 
coaches); increasing player confidence by showing that something is being done about protecting 
them (eight coaches); demonstrating ARU commitment to player safety (eight coaches); increasing 
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the general awareness of safety among players (seven coaches); and developing a standard that 
applies across all levels of the sport (three coaches). 
 
Adoption 
Provision of training to players 
Most (92%) coaches reported providing training for their players in the Mayday procedure during the 
2010 season (n=64). When given the opportunity to identify barriers to training, coaches highlighted: 
players not taking training seriously (11 coaches); not enough players at training (seven coaches); 
technical difficulties (e.g. verbalisation of instructions for physical tasks, coach confidence in teaching 
full procedure, coach not a forward player, practical ways to practice) (seven coaches); and lack of 
time (three coaches). When asked what helped them to provide training in the Mayday procedure, 
identified facilitators included specific ARU courses or resources (39 coaches); assistance of 
experienced coaches or front row players (eight coaches), personal experience as a player (two 
coaches); and having had practical experience of implementing the procedure (one coach). 
 
Using ARU resources  
Seventy percent of coaches reported reading the ARU information or watching the ARU DVD about 
the Mayday procedure (n=64). 
 
Club and Zone policy 
Sixty percent of coaches reported that their club had a policy (18% written and 42% unwritten) that 
required them to train their players in the Mayday procedure (n=62). One third (22% written and 10% 
unwritten) reported that there was such a policy at the zone or association level (n=58). 
 
Implementation 
Provision of training for players on the Mayday procedure 
Although most (92%) coaches reported training their players in the Mayday procedure in the 2010 
season (n=64), such training was infrequent, with 75% and 82% of coaches including training less 
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frequently than every fifth training session during the 2010 pre-season (n=61) or regular season 
(n=61), respectively. Coaches who trained their players frequently (at least every fifth training 
session) were more likely to report having a policy (either written or unwritten) at the club or 
zone/association than those coaches who trained their players infrequently (p values for pre-season 
training by club policy, p= 0.074 or zone/association policy, p= 0.003; for regular season training by 
club policy, p= 0.038 or zone/association, p=0.012). 
 
Training quality and confidence  
Coaches rated how well they had trained their players in 2010 in the Mayday procedure on a scale of 
0 (very poorly) to 5 (very well). Seventy-four percent rated the quality of the Mayday procedure 
training they provided on the upper half of this scale (scores of 3 (18%), 4 (40%) or 5 (16%)) (n=62). 
On a scale of 0 (not at all confident) to 5 (very confident), the majority (92%) rated their confidence 
in their players’ ability to implement the Mayday procedure appropriately during a game if required to 
do so (n=62) on the upper half of the scale (scores of 3 (21%), 4 (44%) or 5 (27%)). 
 
Coaches who trained their players infrequently (less than every fifth training session) were less likely 
to feel they had trained their players well (scores of 3, 4 or 5) than coaches who trained their players 
more frequently (for pre-season training, p=0.006; for regular season training, p=0.052). However, 
there was no statistically significant association between training frequency and the degree of 
confidence that coaches had in their players’ ability to implement the Mayday procedure appropriately 
during a game if required to do so. 
 
About half (52%) of the coaches rated their confidence in the players from other teams being able to 
implement the Mayday procedure appropriately as being in the upper half of the scale (scores of 3 
(18%), 4 (29%) or 5 (5%)); more coaches (73%) were confident that the referee in charge of their 
games would be able to implement the Mayday procedure appropriately (scores of 3 (11%), 4 (27%) 
or 5 (34%)). Refer to Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: Coach confidence in the ability of their players, opposition players and referees to implement the 
Mayday procedure appropriately if required to do so (n=62). 
 
Maintenance 
89% percent of coaches indicated an intention to train their players in the Mayday procedure during 
the 2011 pre-season; and 94% during the 2011 regular season (n=62). 
 
Discussion 
 
The findings of this study show that coaches of senior community rugby union teams are aware of the 
Mayday procedure, mainly through ARU coach education training (particularly the mandatory 
SmartRugby course) and ARU-related resources. Interestingly, other coaches were also identified as 
effective conduits of information, suggesting that future injury prevention intervention dissemination 
efforts among this target group could be enhanced by actively identifying and targeting dissemination 
efforts at community coach opinion leaders with strong interpersonal communication networks. 20 
 
The majority of coaches reported believing that the Mayday procedure effectively prevented injuries. 
This suggests that the ARU has successfully addressed ‘expectation’—anticipatory outcomes of a 
behaviour—as a potential barrier to behaviour change. 21 Many coaches also reported believing that 
the Mayday procedure was at least somewhat effective in increasing player recruitment and retention 
(particularly in encouraging players to play in the front row), and performance. Some coaches in this 
study also perceived that the Mayday procedure provided a standardised response to a potentially 
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serious injury situation that everyone understands, and improved the image of the sport among 
parents, partners and players. These additional perceived benefits could be packaged as ‘relative 
advantages’ of the Mayday procedure to further enhance intervention diffusion. 20 
 
Apart from their knowledge that “Mayday” should be called by the injured player, community 
coaches generally had relatively poor written recall of the other key criteria involved in the Mayday 
procedure. The steps least well identified were the requirements for: all players in the scrum to repeat 
the Mayday call; all players in the scrum to drop to their knees, and for the front row to land on their 
faces. As these steps are important in the Mayday procedure (ensuring quick and clear communication 
of the potential for serious injury; effective depowering of the scrum; and a controlled two-phase 
bringing to ground and unpacking of the scrum to minimise opportunities for rotation, flexion or 
extension of the potentially injured player’s neck), a relatively conservative approach was taken when 
interpreting the coaches’ descriptions of the Mayday procedure. For example expressions such as 
“players are to remain where they are”, “all players go to ground” and “players are peeled out of the 
scrum from the number 8 down to the number 1” were not considered to be specific or detailed 
enough to meet Criteria 3, 4 or 6 respectively. Therefore, the findings derived from analysis of these 
responses may be an under-estimate of the coaches’ actual knowledge. Further, coaches’ knowledge 
of Criteria 1 may also have been underestimated because some may have assumed that the Mayday 
call had been made and it was therefore unnecessary to include Criteria 1 in their description. 
Nonetheless, it may be beneficial for future coach training to focus more on the steps that are 
currently poorly understood by coaches to enhance the fidelity with which Mayday procedure training 
is implemented. 
 
The social cognitive theory 21 maintains that for someone to perform a behaviour they have to both 
know what to do (knowledge) and be able to do it (skill). One of the barriers identified by coaches to 
adopting the Mayday procedure training was their perceived lack of technical and player motivation 
skills (e.g., not knowing how to deliver the training to small numbers of players or how to get players 
interested and willing to participate in the training). This suggests that greater adoption of training 
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might be facilitated by focusing more of the mandatory coach training on “how” to coach the Mayday 
procedure. Particular emphasis should be on practical drills or activities that can be performed with 
less than a full complement of players (e.g., one vs. one and two vs. two drills).  
 
Applying an ecological lens, 2 22 23, the findings suggest other opportunities to influence coaches’ 
decisions to adopt Mayday procedure training. For example, the development of club and zone level 
policies that require coaches to train players in the procedure may be influential. These should be 
clear and unambiguous, well communicated and incorporate a recommended frequency of training 
which should be set by the ARU. Also, given that the successful execution of the Mayday procedure 
depends upon the referee and players from both teams competently performing their role in the 
procedure, activities that promote coach confidence that these groups could implement the Mayday 
procedure if required, may promote adoption.  
 
The findings present some challenges for those seeking to improve community coach implementation 
of Mayday procedure training. Coaches were generally confident that they had trained their players 
well, and that their players could implement the Mayday procedure appropriately, despite the fact that 
most coaches reported not regularly training their players in the procedure. Strategies to address this 
situation might include empowering referees to require teams to regularly demonstrate their 
competency in the procedure before participating in games; creating the expectation21 that coaches 
will provide regular training by incorporating this into zone and club policies, coaching accreditation 
criteria and position descriptions; and highlighting the duty of care that coaches have to ensure that all 
players are competent in the procedure. 
 
The fact that nearly all coaches indicated that they would be providing training in the Mayday 
procedure to players in the 2011 suggests that they consider this as part of their ‘core business’ and 
that the ARU has successfully institutionalised 24 the Mayday procedure into the culture of their 
organisation and the community-level of their sport within Australia. This can probably be attributed 
to the inclusion of the Mayday procedure in the curriculum of the mandatory training for all 
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community rugby union coaches, coach education resources distributed to all coaches, and the ARU 
Medical and Safety Recommendations for clubs and schools. 
 
There are a number of limitations of this study which should be noted. The study response rate was 
low, raising the potential for response bias which could either under or overestimate the variables of 
interest. This was despite an introductory email from the ARU, more than one follow-up reminder 
using two different communication mediums, and a small inducement to participate 25.Low response 
rates in research with community sports coaches are not uncommon 26 27 28 and may be an indication of 
the time constraints facing volunteer coaches in community sport, the timing of survey administration 
(in this case, several weeks after the community rugby season had concluded and coaches were no 
longer actively involved in competitive rugby matches or training), the method of survey (in this case, 
requiring the use of an on-line survey tool), or a general lack of interest in injury prevention activities. 
However, the email of invitation did not detail the intervention of interest, so non-response was not 
associated with the Mayday procedure specifically, although the small number of participants with 
missing data may be those who were unable to answer questions about the procedure. Data are self-
report, and may not represent actual behaviour or intentions. We attempted to minimise the likelihood 
of “socially desirable” responses by guaranteeing anonymity for participants, and assuring them that 
the ARU would receive only aggregated data. 
 
Conclusion 
 
These findings suggest that if the ARU wishes to improve the translation of their Mayday ‘policy’ 
into regular, high quality and sustained implementation at the community club level, then they should 
consider building individual coach, and club or zone/association organisational capacity in the 
following ways: ensure community coaches have the skills, resources and abilities in ‘how’ to train 
their players in the Mayday procedure to complement the knowledge on ‘what’ to train them; and 
create an environment, possibly through policy development and other creative ways, of setting 
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expectations that encourage coaches to provide regular training for their players in the procedure and 
to regularly monitor their players competency to perform the procedure appropriately.  
 
The application of the RE-AIM health promotion evaluation framework proved to be a useful guide 
for identifying opportunities to promote the translation of safety policy in this case study. We believe 
use of the framework could benefit other policy to practice initiatives within the wider sports sector.  
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